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INTRODUCTION

When the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was
established by the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982' it was
vested with the former jurisdiction of its predecessor courts, the U.S.
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the appellate function of
the U.S. Court of Claims, as well as exclusive jurisdiction to hear
appeals from the U.S. Court of International Trade (CIT) and the
U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC or Commission).^ The
Federal Circuit's jurisdiction^ differs significantly from its twelve sister
circuit courts in that it derives exclusively from statutory subject
matter jurisdiction.'* Because the court's exclusive subject matter
jurisdiction eliminates the possibility of a circuit split, international
trade holdings of the Federal Circuit are infrequendy reviewed by the
Supreme Court, rendering the Federal Circuit the court of final
appeal for most trade cases.^
This Article reviews cases decided by the Federal Circuit, on appeal
from the CIT or ITC, during 2012. Though not the busiest docket
the Federal Circuit has contended with in recent years in terms of
international trade cases, 2012 still saw at least one statutory reversal
of a landmark decision.^ Other precedential decisions included five
trade remedy appeals from the CIT, six customs appeals, also from
1. Pub. L. 97-164,96 StaL 25 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C).
2. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5)-(6) (2006) (vesting exclusive jurisdiction over
appeals from the CIT and appeals of ITC determinations under section 337 of the
TariffActofl930).
3. W. §1295.
4. Gompare id. (granting jurisdiction to matters including, inter alia, the
subsumed jurisdiction over appeals from the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, the
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, and the Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences of the U.S. Trademark Office, as well as appeals from the U.S. Merit
Systems Protection Board and certain appeals from U.S. district courts relating to
specific legislation), awrf 38 U.S.C. § 7292 (granting the Federal Circuit jurisdiction
over decisions of die Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims), with 28 U.S.C. § 1291
(providing that the courts of appeals—except the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit—nave jurisdiction over appeals from the federal district courts).
5. But see United States v. Eurodif S.A., 555 U.S. 305 (2009) (reviewing a Federal
Circuit decision overturning the U.S. Department of Commerce's (Commerce's)
imposition of antidumping duties on imports of low enriched uranium).
6. GPX Int'l Tire Corp. v. United States, 666 F.3d 732 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding
that countervailing duties cannot be applied to goods from nonmarket economy
(NME) countries), superseded by statute. Pub. L. 112-99, 126 Stat. 266 (2012), as
recognized in GPX Int'l Tire Corp. v. United States, 678 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
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the CIT, and four reviews of the ITC's section 337 determinations.
Among the trade remedy cases, the Federal Circuit addressed two
scope rulings,' two appeals for relief under the Byrd Amendment,*
one request to overturn a constructed value determination rendered
by the U.S. Department of Commerce (Commerce),^ and one
countervailable subsidy determination.'" Customs cases included two
requests for refund of import taxes," one appeal of a customs
classification ruling,'^ two requests to compel U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (Customs or CBP) to liquidate entries,'* and one
denial—^with an accompanying dissent—of a request to compel
liquidation.'"* The patent-heavy section 337 determinations appealed
from the ITC included cases concerning printer ink cartridges,'^ wind
power turbines,'® cellular telephone technology," and integrated
circuit devices.'*
The Article proceeds in three Parts, each containing a brief
introduction to the statutory and procedural framework of the cases
reviewed. Part I introduces antidumping (AD) and countervailing
duty (CVD) laws and the administrative agencies that implement
them. Part II lays out the general context of section 337 proceedings
undertaken by the ITC. Part III sets forth the general framework of
the customs laws and CBP's administration of those laws.
I.

ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTV LAWS

The AD and CVD laws attempt to provide domestic U.S. industries
a remedy for so-called unfair trade practices.'^ Investigations under
these laws are undertaken simultaneously at Commerce and the

7. Arcelormittal Stainless Belg. N.V. v. United States, 694 F.3d 82 (Fed. Cir.
2012); King Supply Co. v. United States, 674 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
8. PS Chez Sidney, L.L.C. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 684 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir.
2012); Sioux Honey Ass'n v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 672 F.3d 1041 (Fed. Cir.), cert.
denied, 133 S.Ct. 126(2012).
9. PSC VSMPO-Avisma Corp. v. United States, 688 F.3d 751 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
10. EssarSteelLtd.v. United States, 678 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
11. Shell Oil Co. V. United States, 688 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Ford Motor Co.
V. United States, 676 F.3d 1054 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
12. Aromont USA, Inc. v. United States, 671 F.3d 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
13. Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 688 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Norman G.
Jensen, Inc. v. United States, 687 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
14. Hitachi Home Elees. (Am.), Inc. v. United States, 676 F.3d 1041 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (percuriam).
15. Ninestar Tech. Co. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 667 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
16. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 685 F.3d 1034 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
17. Interdigital Commc'ns, LLC v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 690 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
18. Amkor Tech., Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 692 F.3d 1250 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
19. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 167l-1677n (2006) (codifying AD and CVD provisions of the
Tariff Act of 1930, as amended).
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* Commerce is responsible for determining whether dumping
or subsidization took, place, while the ITC determines whether a
domestic industry has been injured (or threatened with injury) by
imports.^'
A. GPX International Tire Corp. v. United States
In GPX International Tire Gorp. v. United States,^^ the Federal Circuit

addressed claims raised in the wake of the March 2012 enactment of
Public Law 112-99,^^ whose section 1 confirmed the applicability of
the CVD law to products originating in countries classified for
antidumping purposes as nonmarket economies (NMEs).^'' The
Federal Circuit had previously sided with GPX in holding that the
CVD law could not be applied to NME products,^^ but Public Law
112-99 prevented the Federal Circuit from finalizing a decision
(issuing a mandate) on that basis and brought the matter back in
front of the court.
Public Law 112-99 took out of play the claim that imposing CVD
relief on products GPX imported from China was automatically
unlawful.^^ Remaining for the Federal Circuit to address were GPX's
claims that (1) the CVD measure should still be voided because the
retroactive element of Public Law 112-99, reaching existing cases and
orders like the one on pneumatic tires, was unconstitutional; and (2)
GPX was at least entitled to a recalculated (lower) total duty because
domestic subsidies identified by Commerce had been double
counted.^^
The Federal Circuit summarized GPX's constitutional claim as
asserting that

20. See id. §§ 1671a-167ld (detailing investígation and decision-making procedures
for the dual system in countervailing duty investigatíons); id. §§ lD73a-1673d
(detailing investigation and decision-making procedures for the dual system in
antidumping duty investigations); id. § 1677(l)-(2) (defining the agencies involved
in the investigation and decision-making process).
21. Id. §§ 1671d(b)(l), 1673d(b)(l).
22. 678 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
23. Pub. L. 112-99, 126 Stat. 266 (2012) (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671,
1677f-l). Section 2 of Public Law 112-99 provided explicit authority for Commerce
to address, in cases processed after the date of enactment, potential double counting
of domestic subsiclies in scenarios where simultaneous antidumping dudes are
calculated using Commerce's NME methodology.
24. Id. § 1 (a); see CPX, 678 F.3d at 1310.
25. GPX Int'l Tire Corp. v. United States, 666 F.3d 732 (Fed. Cir. 2011),
superseded by statute. Pub. L. No. 112-99, 126 Stat. 265 (2012), as recognized in GPX Int'l
Tire Corp. v. United States, 678 F.3d 1308, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
26. GPX, 678 F.3d at 1311.
27. W. at 1312-13.
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the new legislation is unconstitutional because (1) it attempts
to prescribe a rule of decision for this case after our decision
in GPX was rendered; and (2) it improperly creates a special
rule applicable only to this case (or perhaps a few others)
due to the different effective dates in the two provisions . . .
[thereby] creat[ing] a situation in which both antidumping
and countervailing duties may be imposed, without providing
a mechanism to account for potential double counting.^*
The Federal Circuit rejected the first constitutional argument on
the ground that the case was still pending on appeal (no mandate
having issued) at the time of enactment, and the Federal Circuit
directed that the second constitutional argument be addressed in the
first instance by the CIT.^^
The double<ounting claim was based on the contention that
dumping margins calculated using the "NME" or "surrogate" method
of establishing normal value may be higher as a result of domestic
subsidies, and thus may wholly or partially offset those subsidies
making it inappropriate to offset them a second time through
countervailing duties.^" There are different theories (none very
persuasive) about why domestic subsidies might infiuence NME
dumping margin calculations, with some suggesting that such
subsidies might raise normal value and others suggesting that such
subsidies might lower (or lead to a lowering of) export price. There
are also different theories about how—and how actively—Commerce
ought to investigate these hypothetical subsidy-dumping linkages,
and what default rules or presumptions the agency should apply.^'
In any event, this is an important issue for determinations issued
after the enactment date of Public Law 112-99, in light of that law's
section 2. However, GPX's bid for a court-ordered adjustment (along
these lines) of Commerce's 2008 dutji calculations on pneumatic tires
did not succeed.*^ The Federal Circuit held that prior law contained
no implicit norms requiring Commerce, when' simultaneously
calculating domestic subsidy margins and NME-methodology-based

28. /d. at 1312.
29. Id. at 1312-13. The CIT, in an opinion written by Judge Restani,
subsequently upheld the new legislation, rejecting arguments that it violated the
Constitution. GPX Int'l Tire Corp. v. United States, 893 F. Supp. 2d 1296, 1306-18
(Ct. Int'l Trade 2013).
30. GPX Int'l Tire Corp. v. United States, 645 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1240 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 2009), affd, 666 F.3cf 732.
31. John R. Magnus, Double-Remedies and DS 379, INT'L TRADE COMMITTEE NEWSL.
(ABA Section of Int'l Law), May 2012, at 4, 4-7, available at
http://www.tradewinsllc.net/publi/DS379%20ABA%205-ll.
32. GPX, 678 F.3d at 1312.
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dumping margins,^^ to go through special exertions to avoid double
counting.^'*
B. Sioux Honey Ass'n v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co.
In Sioux Honey Ass'n v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co.,^^ the Federal

Circuit dealt with the CIT's jurisdiction to entertain private party
complaints about the U.S. government's under-coUection of
antidumping and countervailing duties, mainly in the context of "new
shipper" transactions^^ carried out in the years when those
transactions were still benefiting from the bonding privilege.^^ The
plaintifFs, domestic producers of honey, garlic, mushrooms, and
crawfish,^ sought to rely on the Continued Dumping and Subsidy
Offset Act of 2000^^ (CDSOA) to establish that the under-collection
direcdy harmed them because the assessed duties would, if collected,
haveflowedthrough to them as CDSOA reimbursements.'*^
Some of the claims had been filed against the U.S. government
itself, and the plaintifFs alleged a mix of improper actions and failures
to act by both Commerce and Customs.**^ The CIT had dismissed
those claims on various grounds, including lack of standing, lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, and failure to state a claim on which relief

33. The term "NME" refers to Commerce's special nonmarket economy
methodology for calculating dumping margins. The term is somewhat loaded in
that, originally applying specifically to communist-bloc nations, its phonedc
pronunciation speaks volumes about Cold War attitudes.
34. Id. at 1312 ("We conclude that the statute prior to the enactment of the new
legislation did not impose a restriction on Commerce's imposition of countervailing
duties on goods imported by NME countries to account for double counting,
(footnote omitted)).
35. 672 F.3d 1041 (Fed. Cir.), cert, denied, 133 S. Ct. 126 (2012).
36. The term "new shipper" refers to an exporting firm that was not shipping
goods to the United States at the dme of the original investigation in an AD or CVT)
proceeding, /d. at 1047.
37. Id. at 1048. The bonding privilege enabled importers to post a bond, rather
than tie up funds with actual cash deposits, when entering merchandise subject to an
order. 19 U.S.C. § 1675 (a) (2) (B) (iii) (2006).
38. Sioux Honey, 672 F.3d at 1048. Because the appeal collected similar claims
arising from several different antidumping orders, plaintiffs here were a collection of
firms comprising Sioux Honey Association; Adee Honey Farms; Monterey
Mushrooms, Inc.; The Garlic Company; and Riceland Crawfish, Inc. Id. at 1041.
39. Pub. L. 106-387, §§ 1001-1003, 114 Stat. 1549, 1549A-72-74, (codified at
19 U.S.C. § 1675c (2000) (repealed 2006)). The CDSOA, also known as the Byrd
Amendment, provided for the duties collected under antidumping orders to be
"distributed . . . to the affected domestic producers for qualifying expenditures."
/d. §1003.
H
/ 5 K
40. Sioux Honey, 672 F.3d at 1048.
41. /d. at 1048-49.
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could be granted.*^ The Federal Gircuit generally upheld the GIT's
ruling on these issues.**
Other claims were directed against surety companies involved in
the bonding transactions. This was an unusual set of claims to be
heard by the GIT, whose caseload ordinarily is limited to claims
against the government, but the . GIT had determined that it
possessed supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.G. §§ 1367 and
1585** to entertain these claims. Ultimately, the Federal Gircuit, after
reviewing the same legislative history relied on by the GIT, reversed
and held that jurisdiction to hear these claims did not exist. *^ ,
C. PS Ghez Sidney, L.L.G. v. United States International Trade
Gommission
PS Chez Sidney, L.L. C. v. United States International Trade Commission^

was the latest in a series of appellate rulings emerging from efforts by
domestic crawfish producer P.S. Ghez Sidney to obtain distributions
of collected antidumping duties through the GDSOA, whose benefits
were in principle confined to domestic producers that "supported"
the underlying petition for import relief.*'
There were two issues addressed. The first was whether the ITG
erred in finding Ghez Sidney GDSOA-ineligible, after it submitted full
domestic-producer questionnaire responses with the "support" box
checked at the preliminary stage and the "take no position" box
checked at the final stage.** The ITG determined that Ghez Sidney
could not be considered as "supporting" the petition based on these
facts and was therefore GDSOA-ineligible.*^ The GIT upheld the
ITG's determination, and the statutory interpretation on which that
determination was based, as reasonable.^" The Federal Gircuit,
reviewing the ITG determination de novo, disagreed.*^ It held that
42. Id. at 1049.
43. /d. at 1056-59.
44. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2006) (providing that the "district courts shall have
supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the
action within such oriçnal jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or
controversy"); id. § 1585 (establishing that the CIT possesses the same powers as a
federal district court).
45. Sioux Honey, 672 F.3d at 1051-54 (rejecting the CIT's reasoning and further
holding that only an explicit grant of authority suffices for CIT jurisdiction).
46. 684F.3dl374(Fed. Cir. 2012).
47. M a t 1376.
48. /d. at 1377,1379.
49. M at 1377-78.
50. Id. at 1378 (characterizing the eligibility question as a determination of fact
on which the court would "not substitute its judgment for the ITC's").
51. Id. at 1379,1382.
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the concept of "support" cannot be limited to what box is checked in
a questionnaire response; and it directed that Chez Sidney be
designated on remand as CDSOA-eligible.^^
The second issue was whether Customs abused its discretion in
determining that it only needed to distribute money to Chez Sidney
insofar as (1) undistributed money was available in the special
clearing account for the Crawfish proceeding or (2) Customs could
successfully recover some of the money already paid out to other
CDSOA-eligible domestic producers.^^ The CIT had sided with
Customs on this point, effectively holding that because Chez Sidney's
CDSOA-eligible status had been confirmed (following lengthy
appeals) at a point when all distributable money had already been
paid out, the company might simply be out of luck.^'' The Federal
Circuit disagreed, holding that Chez Sidney would have to be allowed
to collect some money somehow.^^
D. PSC VSMPO-Avisma Corp. v. United States
PSG VSMPO-Avisma Gorp. v. United State^^ involved a challenge to

Commerce's

dumping

margin

calculations

in . the

second

administrative review of the Magnesium Metal from the Russian

Federatiorv'^ antidumping order. Commerce, using constructed value
to establish the normal value of the iitiported goods at issue, had
calculated a margin of 15.77% for Avisma.^^ ' Per respondent's
successful appeals, the CIT instructed Commerce (1) to reopen the
administrative record to accept a late-filed opinion from a cost
accounting expert, and then (2) to revisit its constructed value
analysis which had (unlawfully in the CIT's view) treated chlorine
and magnesium as co-products.^^ The result was a lower (8.51%)

52. Id. at 1382 (rejecting further the ITC's reliance on the "last indicated
expression of support" in the questionnaire, as the controlling evidence on the
plaintiffs support).
53. /rf. at 1383.
54. See id. (characterizing the CIT decision as finding "[cjustoms had not abused
its discretion by following its published regulations").
55. See id. at 1383-84 ("Chez Sidney . . . should be treated in the same manner as
any other ADP eligible to receive . . . distributions. We therefore vacate that portion
of the judgment establishing the mechanism by which Chez Sidney would receive its
funds. On remand, the Court of International Trade should fashion a remedy that
ensures Chez Sidney will receive the money to which it is entitled . . . .").•
56. 688 F.3d 751 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
57. 70 Fed. Reg. 19,930 (Dep't of Commerce Apr. 15, 2005) (notice of
antidumping duty order).
58. PSC VSMPO-Avisma Corp., 688 F.3d at 753.
59. /á. at 754, 756-59.
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margin calculation, which the CIT upheld.*'" The petitioner then
challenged the CIT's actions before the Federal Circuit.®'
The Federal Circuit reversed on both issues, ordering that
Commerce's original determination be reinstated and finding that
the CIT acted improperly in requiring Commerce to accept the
expert's affidavit and change its original cost calculation.®^ In
particular, the Federal Circuit held that it was error to force
Commerce to make an exception to its deadlines for the submission
of factual information,®^ and that Commerce's cost accounting
approach did not violate any statutory directive and therefore should
not have been disturbed.®*
E. King Supply Co. v. United States
In King Supply Co. v. United States,^^ the Federal Circuit upheld a
Commerce Department finding that a particular type of pipe fitting
was within the scope of the antidumping order on Certain Carbon Steel
Butt-Weld Pipe Fittings from China.^^ In doing so, the Federal Circuit
overturned a CIT decision reversing Commerce's scope
determination.®'
Commerce is frequently called upon to clarify whether particular
imported products iall within or outside the scope of antidumping
proceedings.®* Scope rulings are most often requested by importers
seeking to confirm that their products can enter the United States
without the need for antidumping duty deposits, but they can also be
requested by domestic producers who observe, in the marketplace,
imported products which they believe are wrongly bypassing an
antidumping order.®®
Commerce's regulations provide for both expedited and (where
necessaiy) more drawn-out scope inquiries. The agency begins by
comparing the disputed product to the merchandise descriptions
contained in the petition and in prior agency (Commerce and ITC)

60. /d. at 754.
61. Mat754-55.
62. Id. at 761, 765.
63. M at 761.
64. M at 765.
65. 674 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
66. 57 Fed. Reg. 29,702 (Dep't of Commerce July 6,1992) (antidumping duty order).
67. King Supply, 674 F.3d at 1351.
68. S«el9C.F.R. §351.225(a) (2012). . .
69. See, e.g.. King Supply, 674 F.3d at 1347 ("King requested that Commerce issue
a scope ruling that butt-weld pipe fittings imported by King from China are outside
the scope of the [antidumping order].").
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determinations issued within the relevant antidumping proceeding.'^
Commerce can complete its analysis at this point, and issue an
expedited ruling summarily fmding the disputed product to be either
in-scope or out-of-scope, if it determines based on these materials
alone that there is no ambiguity.'^ If Commerce does find ambiguity,
and believes it needs to conduct a more in-depth analysis (perhaps
with the aid of newly-gathered factual evidence), Commerce opens
up a "full" scope inquiry and moves on to consider the so-called
"(k)(2)" or "Diversified Products" factors.'^ L^J^^ ^^^^^ ^^.^ ^f
agency-level antidumping determinations, Commerce's scope rulings
are subject to judicial review under the "substantial evidence" and
"otherwise contrary to law" standards.'^
The King Supply dispute arose because of language in the
antidumping order's scope description, which read:
The product covered by this order is carbon steel butt-weld
pipe fittings, having an inside diameter of less than 14
inches, imported in either finished or unfinished form.
These formed or forged pipe fittings are used to join sections
in piping systems where conditions require permanent,
welded connections, as distinguished from fittings based on
other fastening methods {e.g., threaded, grooved, or bolted
fittings)."'-*
At issue was whether the second sentence, describing how the
subject fittings are normally used, amounted to an "end-use
restriction" such that otherwise-qualifying fittings not used (or
destined for use) in the mentioned application would be excluded.'^
The CIT, in reversing Commerce, had concluded that the second
sentence did indeed amount to an end-use-based restriction on the
order's coverage.'^ Emphasizing that Commerce had neglected to
include in this sentence a qualifying clause, the CIT had held that
Commerce was obliged to find King Supply's merchandise to be outof-scope."
70. See\9 C.F.R. § 351.225(a) (describing the Department of Commerce's "scope
rulings").
71. /d. §351.225(d), (k){l).
72. /d. §351.225(e), (k)(2).
73. See King Supply, 674 F.3d at 1348 ("We must... uphold Commerce's determination
unless the SœpeRuuv^Ss 'unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise
not in accordance with law.'" (quoting 19 U.S.C. §1516a(b)(l)(B)(i) (2006))).
74. Certain Carbon Steel Butt-Weld Pipe Fittings from China, 57 Fed. Reg.
29,702 (Dep't of Commerce July 6, 1992) (antidumping duty order).
75. King Supply, 674 F.3d at 1347.
76. King Supply Co. LLC v. United States, No. 09-00477, 2010 WL 3790082, at *2-3
(Ct. Int'l Trade Sept. 30, 2010), rev'd, 674 F.3d 1343.
77. M at*2-4.
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The Federal Circuit, reviewing Commerce's determination de
novo, saw things differently. It reasoned that end-use information
of this type should not be construed as limiting the coverage of an
AD order unless there is clear language leaving no reasonable
doubt that certain products were intended to be excluded strictly
on the basis of their end use.™ The panel then stated that the CIT
had placed "undue emphasis" on the end-use language at issue
here—particularly in light of the deference owed to Commerce's own
interpretation of the scope description™—and had erred in
substituting its own (perhaps also reasonable) analysis for
Commerce's.®" Ultimately, the panel held that Commerce reasonably
interpreted the order's scope language to include King Supply's
merchandise, and that Commerce's scope determination was indeed
supported by substantial record evidence.®^
K Arcelormittal Stainless Belgium N.V. v. United States
In Arcelormittal Stainless Belgium N.V. v. United States,^^ the Federal

Circuit overturned a Commerce Department scope ruling that, the
court held, was not supported by substantial evidence.*^
The operative language in the antidumping order reads as follows:
"The subject plate products are flat-rolled products, 254 mm or over
in width and 4.75 mm or more in thickness . . . ."^^ A Belgian
exporter sought a ruling on products with a nominal thickness above
4.75 mm but an actual (as delivered) thickness below 4.75 mm.^^
Commerce found the above-quoted scope language to be
ambiguous—noting among other things that industry practice used
both a nominal (as ordered) and actual (as delivered) measurement,
depending upon the stage of the supply chain*®—and ruled the
products under review to be in-scope despite their thinness.*' The
78. See King Supply, 674 F.3d at 1348-49 (noting the difficulty in administering
end-use restrictions and drawing a contrast witn clear exclusionary language
appearing in past orders).
79. See id. at 1350 (drawing from Federal Gircuit cases, such as Tak Fat Trading
Co. V. United States, 396 F.3d 1378, 1382 (Fed. Gir. 2005), to illustrate the deference
owed Gommerce).
80. /d. at 1351.
81. Id.; see also \9\J.S.C. § 1516a(b)(l)(B)(i) (2006).
82. 694 F.3d 82 (Fed. Gir. 2012).
83. «.at84.
84. M at 86.
85. /d. at83.
86. Id. at 85-86 (discussing the industry practice of maintaining both nominal
and actual thickness measurements via a standardized tolerance system, within which
deviations of actual from as ordered are acceptable).
87. /d. at 83-84.

974

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:963

CIT affirmed.^^ The Federal Circuit, reviewing Commerce's ruling de
novo, focused on the fact that antidumping orders apply only to
goods as they are imported, not as they are ordered, and that, thus,
the scope could only be interpreted as applying to actual thickness as
delivered.^^ This view was further supported by Commerce's
previously rendered interpretation^'' of the same antidumping order
as applying only to merchandise with an actual thickness of 4.75
mm.^' The Federal Circuit noted that while the bar is low for
sustaining Commerce's finding, "it is not justifiable to identify an
ambiguity where none exists."^^ The Federal Circuit further
cautioned that "Commerce's discretion to define and clarify the
scope of an investigation is limited by concerns for transparency of
administrative actions."^^ In other words. Commerce cannot cloak a
substantive change to the scope of an order in the guise of
interpreta tion.^**
G. Essar Steel Ltd. v. United States
In Essar Steel Ltd. v. United States?^ the Federal Circuit dealt with

cross-appeals arising out of Commerce's countervailing duty
determination on hot-rolled carbon steel flat products from India.^^
Essar, an Indian exporter, had challenged on appeal Commerce's
finding that Essar received countervailable subsidies under two
separate programs of the government of India. In particular, Essar
objected to ( 1 ) the benchmark prices Commerce used in
determining whether Essar had obtained iron ore from the Indian
government-owned National Mineral Development Corporation
(NMDC) for less than adequate remuneration;^' and (2) Commerce's
finding that Special Economic Zone (SEZ) benefits accrued to all
88. /rf. at84.
89. W. at88.
90. Certain Cut-toLength Carbon Steel Plate from South Africa, 62 Fed. Reg.
61,731 (Dep't of Commerce Nov. 19, 1997) (notice).
91. See Arcelormittal Stainless, 694 F.3d at 88-89 (laying out the facts of the prior
scope ruling and Commerce's unequivocal statements regarding the clarity of the
original scope).
92. Id. at 89 (internal quotation marks omitted).
93. Id. at 90.
94. See id. (citing Duferco Steel, Inc. v. United States, 296 F.3d 1087, 1095 (Fed.
Cir. 2002)); see also Eckstrom Indus., Inc. v. United States, 254 F.3d 1068, 1072 (Fed.
Cir. 2001 ) (limiting Commerce from changing the scope of an order or,
"interpret[ing] an order in a manner contrary to its terms"); Ericsson GE Mobile
Commc'ns, Inc. v. United States, 60 F.3d 778, 782 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (discussing
deference granted to Commerce's interpretation by the Federal Circuit).
95. 678F.3dl268(Fed. Cir. 2012).
96. Id.
97. M at 1270.
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Essar exports, rather than being tied to particular products.®* The
CIT had sided with Commerce on both points, and the Federal
Circuit, reviewing de novo, likewise upheld Commerce's
determinations.®® In particular, the Federal Circuit found that
Commerce had properly accounted for comparability factors when
selecting benchmarks in its evaluation of the iron ore transactions.'""
The Federal Circuit further found Commerce's allocation of the SEZ
benefits to all Essar exports to be supported by substantial
evidence.'"'
The cross-appeals were brought by the United States and U.S. Steel
Corp. as co-cross appellants. Commerce had applied adverse
inferences in determining that Essar received countervailable subsidies
under the Chhattisgarh Industrial Program (CIP).'"^ The agency cited,
in this regard, less-than-satisfactory efforts by both Essar and the Indian
government in providing requested information.'"^ The CIT, while
agreeing that the respondents had not cooperated to the best of their
ability with Commerce's investigation, nevertheless remanded this
determination, in part on the basis of factual information that had
come to the CIT's attention but was not part of the administrative
record underlying the challenged determination.'"* The CIT directed
Commerce to reopen the record and consider this additional
information.'"^
The co-cross appellants asked the Federal Circuit to restore
Commerce's original determination.'"^ The Federal Circuit did so,
and along the way clarified its views with regard to the use of adverse
inferences by Commerce."" Under Nippon Steel Gorp. v. United
States,^^^ Commerce assesses whether a respondent has maximized its
efforts to provide "full and complete answers to all inquiries"—a
98. /d. at 1271.
99. Id. at 1270,1272.
100. Id. at 1273-74.
101. /á. at 1274.
102. « . a t 1270-71.
103. Id. at 1271-72 (explaining Commerce's frustration with the Indian
government's lack of cooperation with respect to the SEZ Act and describing
Commerce's views that Essar failed to cooperate to the best of its ability). Where a
respondent fails to cooperate to the best of its ability. Commerce "may use an
inference that is adverse to the interests of that party in selecting from among the
facts otherwise available." 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b) (2006).
104. Essar Steel Ltd., 678 F.3d at 1275.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1274.
107. See id. at 1278-79 ("We have recognized Commerce's authority to apply
adverse facts, even when a party provides relevant factual information if a party has
not acted to the best of its ability to provide the information.").
108. 337 F.3d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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standard Essar failed here by not producing key documents in its
possession.'^ The panel went on to explain that die discretion to
apply adverse inferences is important because Commerce lacks
subpoena power and needs some other method of incentivizing
cooperation. "° Because the burden to create an accurate record lay
with Essar,'" Commerce's decision to use adverse inferences was
supported by substantial evidence and the CIT should not have
disturbed it or required a reopening of the record."^ Judge
Newman, dissenting in part but concurring in the result, took issue
with the majority's opinion that the CIT acted outside its authority in
ordering Commerce to reopen the record."^
• IL SECTION 337
Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930"'' is designed to provide an
expedient remedy in cases where "unfair methods of competition"
are utilized in U.S. import trade."^ Usage of 337 has been growing
sharply, attributed largely to its speed and quality of remedy."^ The
number of cases has increased over 530% from fiscal year 2000 to
fiscal year 2011."^ The Federal Circuit reviews 337 appeals direcdy
from the ITC, rather than after review at the CIT."^
A. Ninestar Technology Co. v. International Trade Commission
In Ninestar Technology Go. v. International Trade Gommission,^^^ the

Federal Circuit affirmed an ITC decision assessing civil penalties for
109. Essar Steel Ltd., 678 F.3d at 1275-76 (quoting Nippon Steel, 337 F.3d at 1382).
110. See id. at 1276 (distinguishing between a mechanism for compelling
cooperation and one that would be inappropriately punitive).
111. Id. at 1277 {citing Zenith Elees. Corp. v. United States, 988 F.2d 1573, 1583
(Fed. Cir. 1993)).
112. M at 1278-79.
113. Id. at 1279-80 (Newman, J., dissenting) (citing the importance of creating an
accurate record).
114. 19 U.S.C. §1337(2006).
115. Id. § 1337(a)(l)(A). Patent-based claims have dominated the section 337
docket in recent years. U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, FACTS AND TRENDS REGARDING
USITC SECTION 337 Im^STiGATiONS 1 (2012) [hereinafter ITC 337 FACT SHEET],
auai7ûô/ea/www.usitc.gov/press_room/documents/featured_news/337facts.pdf.
116. The section 337 remedy provides for the issuance of a general exclusion
order, entirely preventing importation of offending merchandise, or a limited
exclusion order, preventing importations by named parties. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d).
These orders can be backed up by cease and desist orders. Id. § 1337(f).
Furthermore, the timing of a sectíon 337 action is tightly choreographed, yielding a
final determination within seventeen months plus an additional sixty days for
Presidential review of affirmative findings, with temporary relief available in as little
as ninety days after institution. Id. § 1337(e)(2), (j)(2).
117. ITC 337 FACT SHEET, supra note 115.
118. 19 U.S.C. §1337{c).
119. 667 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
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violation of exclusion and cease and desist orders issued under
section 337.'^" The ITC had issued an exclusion order pursuant to its
finding that ink cartridges that Ninestar'^' produced in China and
imported into the United States infringed patents owned and
exclusively licensed to Epson (including the separate entities Epson
America, Inc., Epson Portland Inc., and Seiko Epson Corp.).'^^ When
Ninestar continued to import and sell ink cartridges subject to the
exclusion order, the complainant requested enforcement measures
which eventually led to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
recommending, and the full Commission assessing, monetary
penalties.'^*
Ninestar asked the Federal Circuit to cancel the civil penalties on
the ground that its conduct, while violating the ITC orders, would
have been considered lawful under a particular line of patent law
cases involving the territoriality and "first sale" principles.'^* The
Federal Circuit brushed aside this argument.'^^
Ninestar also offered a constitutional challenge, arguing that
section 337 itself and the Commission's actions in this case violated
Ninestar's constitutional right to "notice, clarity, and a jury trial," as
well as the principle of separation of powers.'^^ The Federal Circuit
agreed to address these claims, even though they had not been raised
at the agency level, because they "relate [d] to the foundations of
governmental process."'^' But the claims failed.'^* The Federal
Circuit held that section 337 proceedings serve the public interest in
controlling unfair competition, that Congress acted constitutionally
in creating the statutory rights section 337 embodies, and that the
ITC violated no constitutional constraints in enforcing its orders in
this case through monetary penalties.'^^

120. Id. at 1376; see also 19 U.S.C. § 1337(f).
121. For ease of reference, "Ninestar China" is used here to refer to Ninestar
Technology Co., Ltd., and "Ninestar" refers to that firm's wholly owned U.S. subsidiaries,
named appellants Ninestar Technology Company, Ltd., and Town Sky, Inc.
122. Ninestar, 667 F.3d at 1376 (citing Certain Ink Cartridges and Components
Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-565, USITC Pub. 4195 (Oct. 19, 2007) (Final)).
123. M a t 1377.
124. /íí. at 1378.
125. See id. at 1378-79 (discussing Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LC Electronics, Inc., 553
U.S. 617, 632 n.6 (2008) and Fujifilm Corp. v. Benun, 605 F.3d 1366, 1371 (Fed. Cir.
2010), and concluding that the precedent cited by Ninestar neither controlled this
section 337 case nor even supported the proposition for which Ninestar had invoked it).
126. M a t 1377.
127. M at 1382.
128. M a t 1384.
129. Id. (quoting Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442, 460-61 (1977)).
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B. General Electric Co. v. International Trade Commission
In an appeal of the ITC's decision that certain variable speed wind
turbines'^** imported by Mitsubishi did not violate section 337, the
Federal

Circuit

in

Ceneral Electric Co. v. International Trade

had before it three separate patents: '039'^^, '221, and
The court affirmed the Commission's ruling that the '221
patent was not being infringed.'^** However, the court remanded the
Commission's determination, which had also favored the respondent
Mitsubishi, in regard to the '985 patent.'^^
With respect to the '221 patent, the Commission had focused on
the claims addressing the method of circuitry recoupling after an
emergency-induced current spike.'^^ Specifically, the Commission
found that the meaning of the term "predetermined value" in
patent claim five could only be construed to refer to a specific
predetermined value of current, rather than a pre-set period of
time.'^'
Looking back through recent Federal Circuit
jurisprudence, the panel noted that construing "predetermined
value" as monitoring current or voltage (as current proxy) hewed
most closely to the patent's description of the invention.'**^
Regarding infringement, the panel noted substantial evidence on
the record supporting the Commission's finding that a system that
measures the actual end moment of a given emergency event is not
substantially the same as one that applies a set time period to all
emergency events.

130. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 685 F.3d 1034, 1037-38 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (presenting a general explanation of electric power generating wind turbine
technology). The patents in question are, in brief, for technology designed to
moderate the effect of emergency events such as lightning strikes or short circuits on
the turbines' overall work of converting irregular wind energy to widely consumable
fixed-frequency alternating current (AC). Id. at 1037.
131. 685 F.3d 1034 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The decision considered here is as revised
upon granting of a petition for panel rehearing for the limited purpose of
withdrawing Part III of the original opinion.
132. Id. at 1037. The court did not reach the question of the '039 patent as it
expired during the pendency of the proceeding on February 1, 2011. Id. at 1038.
133. Id. at 1036. We are adopting here the panel's shorthand for Ceneral
Electric's U.S. Patents: No. 7,321,221 ('221), No. 5,083,039 ('039), and No.
6,921,985 ('985).
134. M a t 1042.
135. /d. at 1046.
136. M a t 1038-39.
137. See id. at 1040 (highlighting that the ALJ accepted General Electric's
argument that a time constant could be included in the definition of
"predetermined value").
138. Id. at 1041 (quoting Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303,1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
139. M a t 1042.
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The '985 patent presented a question of whether, when properly
construed, the petitioner's claim satisfied the domestic industry
requirement of § 1337(a)(2)-(3).""' The full Commission, in
contradicting the ALJ's findings, held that the terms of the patent
required specific location of shunting circuitry external to the
inverter.'*' The panel, however, cited Linear Technology Corp. v.
International Trade Commission^'*^ for the proposition that, absent claim
language explicidy calling for it, terms should not be read to include
specific structural requirements so long as the circuits perform their
stated function.'*^ Reversing the Commission's finding that the
additional structural requirement in the '985 patent caused Ceneral
Electric to fail the domestic industry requirement, the panel
remanded the matter for proceedings consistent with the corrected
claim construction.'**
Judge Newman's dissent addressed the question raised by the
Commission's request for rehearing.'*^ As frameid by Judge Newman,
the Commission sought to prevent the completion of this section 337
action by requesting removal of the infringement and validity claims
relating to the '985 patent from judicial review.'*^ In a lengthy
discussion of the expeditious resolution imperative behind
authorizing statutes of both section 337 actions and the Commission
itself. Judge Newman pointed to general appellate practice and the
stay of district court proceedings provided in 28 U.S.C. § 1659'*' as
further factors all supporting denial of the ITC's request.'*® In
closing. Judge Newman admonished the panel for performing a
"disservice to the parties and the public," claiming that the Federal
Circuit should have, at the least, resolved the case en banc.'*^
140. Id. The domestic industry requirement is established in § 1337(a)(2),
which provides that § 1337(a)(l) applies only if an industry in the United States
exists or. is in the process of being estabhshed that relates to the "articles
protected by the patent, copyright, trademark, mask work, or design concerned,"
and § 1337(a) (3) gives guidelines for when a domestic industry shall be considered
to exist. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(2)-(3) (2006).
141. Gen. Eke, 685 F.3d at 1042-45.
142. 566 F.3d 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
143. Gen. Eke, 685 F.3d at 1045-46.
144. /d. at 1046.
145. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 692 F.3d 1219, 1219 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(Newman, J., dissenting from the panel action on rehearing) (arguing that the issues
at hand had already been fully investigated, litigated, and decided in the ITC, and
that the ITC's request for rehearing "negate[s] the finality of these final decisions").
146. /d. at 1219-20.
147. 28 U.S.C. §1659(2006).
148. See Gen. Eke. Go., 692 F.3d at 1220-23 (Newman, J., dissenting from the panel
action on rehearing) (asserting that speedy adjudication has been identified as
necessary for protection of intellectual property rights).
149. M at 1223.
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C. Interdigital Communications, LLC v. International Trade
Commission
The Federal Circuit in Interdigital Gommunications, LLG v.
International Trade Gommission^^^ reversed the Commission's

determination as based on improperly construed claim terms and
remanded to the Commission for further proceedings in light of the
clarified terms.'^' At issue were telephone handsets imported by
Nokia that were found to infringe wireless cellular telephone
technology patents dealing with both method and apparatus of call
initiation. '^^ In construing the terms of the patents, the ALJ
bifurcated the analysis such that the meaning of the separate terms
"code" and "increased power level" applied during claim construction
was different from the definitions used during evaluation of the
infringement claims. *^^
In Federal Circuit practice, claim terms are given their plain
meaning as understood by persons skilled in the art unless the
patentee provides a special definition for a given term during
specification or prosecution.'^'' The record refiected that the plain
meaning of "code" to one skilled in the art of cellphone
communications is a sequence of bits (if transmitted at the "data
rate") or chips (if transmitted at the "chip rate").'^^ The ALJ
selected an approach that could only include certain codes
transmitted at the latter "chip rate" in its definition of the
specialized "spreading codes," even though the terms of the patent
and expert witness testimony clearly stated that all codes transmitted
at the chip rate are indicated by the term "spreading codes."'^^
Thus, the ALJ worked with a definition other than that used by the
patent itself and at least some of the claimants, leading the Federal
Circuit to remand the matter for reconsideration with use of a
consistent definition of spreading
^

150. 690 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2012), reh'g granted, 707 F.3d. 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2013),
petition for cert,filedsie nom. Nokia Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, No. 12-1352, 2013 WL
1963893{U.S. MaylO, 2013).
151. /rf. at 1330.
152. Id. at 1323. The patents shared the title "Method and Apparatus for
Performing an Access Procedure" and apply to the "handshake"—or connection
initiation—portion of a cellular telephone call. Id. at 1320.
153. /d. at 1323-24.
154. Id. at 1324 (citing Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312-13, 1316 (Fed.
Cir. 2005)).
155. Id.
156. /á. at 1327.
157. /d. at 1327,1330.
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Similarly, the court concluded that the ALJ and the Commission
incorrectly selected a definition of the patent term "increased power
level" that was unnecessarily restrictive so as to render it incapable of
including step-wise transmission power level increases.'^^ The Federal
Circuit corrected this language construction zind remanded the
second claim as well, brushing aside Nokia's alternative argument
that mere licensing activities within the LJnited States cannot satisfy
section 337's "domestic industry" requirement.'^®
Judge Newman's dissent argued that the panel majority's
construction of the patent term "code" is both unsupported and
different from what a person experienced in the field would have
understood upon reading the patent specifications.'^"
D. Amkor Technology, Inc. v. International Trade Commission
In Amkor Technology, Inc. v. International Trade. Commission}^^ the

Federal Circuit held that pursuant to 35 U.S.C. §. 102(g)(2),"^^ the
ITC applied an erroneous legal standard in finding Amkor's patent
invalid.'*^^ Amkor filed a 337 action on December 19, 2003 claiming
that certain encapsulated integrated circuit devices imported by
intervener Carsem infringed Amkor's U.S. patent.'" Integral to
Carsem's defense were several documents relating to third party
ASAT's US. Patent No. 6,229,200 that the ITC was not able to obtain
until July of 2009.'®^
The Commission then rendered the
determination in question by relying on the OÄa rule'®'' to invalidate
Amkor's patent on the grounds that the earliest possible priority date
for the patent's claim fell after the date of invention for the ASAT
patent.'^'
.
Section 102 (g) (2) states that an applicant will not be granted a
patent where the invention was made in this country prior to the
application by some other inventor who did not abandon, suppress.

158. M a t 1327-28.
159. /d. at 1329-30.
160. Id. at 1330 (Newman,J., dissenting).
161. 692 F.3d 1250 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
162. 35 U.S.C. §102(2006).
163. AmÄorTecÄ., 692 F.3d at 1251.
164. Id. at 1251-52 (referencing Amkor's U.S. Patent No. 6,433,277).
165. Id. at 1253-54 (laying out the lengthy procedural history).
166. Oka V. Youssefyeh, 849 F.2d 581, 584 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (establishing the last
possible conception date as the standard where a party can only provide a range of
possible conception dates).
167. Amkor Tech., 692 F.3d at 1254 (citing the ITC's opinion at Commission Op.,
Inv. No. 337-TA-501, at 12 (July 27, 2010)).
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or conceal it.'^ Section 102(g) (1) further lays out specific additional
requirements in cases of interference'^ by reference to additional
sections of the code.'^° The Federal Circuit pointed out that the Oka
rule applies only to interference cases arising under § 102(g) (1) and
not to validity disputes arising under § 102(g)(2), as in this case.''*
The correct legal standard here, the court stated, was that an issued
patent's presumption of validity under 35 U.S.C. § 282 can only be
overcome by clear and convincing evidence—a bar Carsem fell short
of by merely establishing that ASAT "might have" conceived the
devices first.'^^
Upon consideration of Carsem's alternative argument that Amkor's
patent is invalid as anticipated and obvious, the Federal Circuit
opined that the modification Amkor sought to patent was not
obvious.'^^
III. CUSTOMS

Customs, including its predecessor incarnation, the U.S. Customs
Service,'^'' is by far the oldest trade agency in the U.S. government.'^^
On July 31, 1789, the U.S. Customs Service was formed under the
fifth act of the first Congress.'"^ Until the establishment of the
Internal Revenue Service (1RS) via the Underwood Tariff Act of
1913,'" Customs was the primary source of U.S. federal government
168. 35 U.S.C. § ]02(g)(2) (2006), amended by Leahy-Smith America Invents Act,
Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3(b)(l_), (n), 125 Stat. 284, 285, 293 (2011).
169. Id. § 135(a) (explaining an interference as "[wjhenever an application is made
for a patent which, in die opinion of the Director, would interfere with any pending
application, or with any unexpired patent, an interference may be declared").
1^0. M§102(g)(l).
171. Amk&r Tech., 692 F.3d at 1258. In order to get to the question of validity,
the Federal Circuit considered its ruling that the date of patent conception is the
date the invention is first reported to the inventor's U.S* agent in Scott v. Koyama,
281 F.3d 1243 (Fed. Cir. 2002), controlling even though Scott arose out of a prior
version of § 102(g) that did not distinguish interference claims from prior invention
claims. It cited Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 581 (1978), to reason that Congress
can be presumed to have had notice and intent to incorporate existing
interpretations where adopting a new law that includes sections of a prior law. Amkor
TecA., 692F.3datl255.
172. Amkor Tech., 692 F.3d at 1258.
173. Id. at 1258-61 (evaluating the technical details of the claim).
174. See^uW v. United States, 479 F.3d 1365, 1368 n.l (Fed. Cir. 2007) (discussing
transition from U.S. Customs Service within Treasury Department to Bureau of
Customs and Border Protection within Department of Homeland Security).
175. See generally 1789 Collecüon Act, Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, 1 Stat. 29, § 38
(establishing the government's regulation of collecting duties imposed on ships,
vessels, and goods coming in to the United States).
176. Id.
177. Pub. L. No. 63-16, 38 Stat. 114 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
26 U.S.C.) (reinstating federal income tax and establishing a system to collect).
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revenue.'™ Formerly under the auspices of the Treasury Department,
in 2003 Customs and several other agencies were brought within the
newly established Department of Homeland Security (DHS).'™
Customs' primary trade function is to administer the tariff code at
the border. It has authority to inspect all ingoing and outgoing
shipments, deals with the relevant filings and paperwork required by
law, levies the appropriate duties, and generally controls thefiowof
goods through all U.S. ports of entry.'®" Although Customs' most
frequent trade activity^tariff classification rulings under the
Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS)'«'—is
scarcely represented in the Federal Circuit's 2012 docket, its other
activities relating to duty assessment and payment kept the court busy
nonetheless. The Federal Circuit also decided one customs-related
case that was treated first not by Customs but by the CIT.'®^
A. Aromont USA, Inc. v. United States
In Aromont USA, Inc. v. United States,^^^ Aromont challenged a

Customs decision classifying certain imported fiavorings in HTSUS
subheading 2104 rather than in subheading 2106 where the duty rate
was lower.'®* The CIT had sided with Aromont, overruling Customs
on the question of classification, and the United States appealed to
the Federal Circuit.'®^ Reviewing the case de novo,'®^ the panel
focused on defining the principal use of Aromont's goods according
to the so-called Carborundum factors.^^^
178. History of the US Tax System, ALMANAC OF ?OUCY ISSUES (Aug., 2003),
http://www.policyalmanac.org/economic/archive/tax_history.shtnil.
179. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135
(codified at 6 U.S.G. §§ 101-557 (2006)). Some twenty-two discreet agencies and
departments were rolled into DHS at its inception.
180. Gustoms provisions are grouped and codified in Title 19 U.S.G.
181. U.S. INT'L TRADE GOMM'N, USITG PUB. 4299, HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE OF
THE UNITED STATES (2012).

182. Norman G.Jensen, Inc. v. United States, 687 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Gir. 2012).
183. 671 F.3d 1310 (Fed. Gir. 2012).
184. Id. at 1311. Customs concluded that Aromont's imported flavorings fell
under HTSUS subheading 2104.10.00 (2104) covering, "[s]oups and broths and
preparations therefor." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Aromont filed a
protest stating that the flavorings should have been classified under subheading
2106.90.99 (2106) for "[flood preparations not elsewhere specified or included,'
and appealed Gustoms' denial of the protest to the GIT. Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted).
185. Id.
186. See id. at 1312 (citing Intercont'l Marble Gorp. v. United States, 381 F.3d
1169, 1173 (Fed. Gir. 2004), to establish that decisions on motion of summary
judgment should be reviewed de novo).
18í. Id. at 1312-13. Carborundum factors include actual tise; physical characteristics;
cost; expectations of the ultimate purchasers; economic practicality of the use;
channels of trade; environment of the sale; manner of advertising and display;

984

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:963

In Customs practice, provisions that focus on the use of a good,
rather than its name (in this case the "preparations therefor"
language contained in 2104), are governed by HTSUS Additional
U.S. Rules of Interpretation l(a) (ARI l(a)).'^ The principal use is
that "'which exceeds any other single use.""^^ Aromont's argument
focused in part on the "actual" use of the disputed goods, a factor the
U.S. government sought to dismiss as irrelevant.'^** The Federal
Circuit pointed out that actual use is a relevant, though not
controlling, factor in interpreting a principal use provision.'^'
Upon considering all factors, the panel found that Aromont's
strong evidentiary case with respect to actual use, physical
characteristics, and cost overcame the government's effort to show
that other factors required a different result.'^^ Thus, the panel
affirmed the CIT's summary judgment holding that Aromont's goods
were properly classified under Heading 2106 based on their principal
use.'^^
B. Hitachi Home Electronics (America), Inc. v. United States
In Hitachi Home Electronics (America), Inc. v. United States,^^'^ the

Federal Circuit declined to reconsider en bane a case involving
Customs deadlines.'^^ The case is noteworthy for a dissent in which
Judge Reyna set forth his view of why Customs is required by 19 U.S.C.
§ 1515(a)'^^ to resolve protests within two years. Judge Reyna argued
that a reading of the statute permitting extensions beyond the two-year
deadline is inconsistent with existing business realities'^' and, indeed.
Congress's intent in drafting § 1515.'^^ The dissent closes by pointing
out that § 1515's language requires Customs to allow or deny protests,
thereby indicating a consequence of Customs' inaction, and that

recognition in the trade; etc. See United States v. Carborundum Co., 536 F.2d 373, 377
(C.C.P.A. 1976) (laying out the factors courts consider for principal use).
188; Aromont, 671 F.3d at 1312.
189. Id. (quoting Lenox Collections v. United States, 20 C.I.T. 194,196 (1996)).
190. /d. at 1313.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 1316. The Court's analysis showed that neither side provided
persuasive evidence with respect to expectations of purchasers, channels of trade,
environment of sale, or recognition in trade factors. Id. at 1315-16.
193. W. at 1316.
194. 676 F.3d 1041 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (per curiam).
195. M at 1042.
196. 19 U.S.C. § 1515(a) (2006).
197. See Hitachi, 676 F.3d at 1042 (Reyna, J., dissenting) (citing Customs and
International Trade Bar Association's (CITBA's) brief).
198. See id. (referring to both House and Senate legislative history to show that
Congress intended a clear deadline).
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should Customs find its docket unmanageable within the stated
deadline, it should petition Congress for a statutory fix.'^^
C. Ford Motor Co. v. United States
In Eard Motor Go. v. United States,^°° the Federal Circuit affirmed the
CIT's finding that Ford failed to submit proof of Harbor
Maintenance Tax^°' (HMT) payments sufficient to satisfy applicable
regulations.^"^
Congress had enacted the Water Resources
Development Act of 1986^°^ imposing an ad valorem tax on all
exports, imports, and domestic shipments passing through U.S.
ports.^"* As part of a complex payment system. Customs set up
payment accounts at the First Chicago Bank, which, in turn,
transmitted payment records nightly to Customs' Automated
Commercial System (ACS) database, which Customs did not monitor
for accuracy.^"^ In implementing the refunds necessitated by the
Supreme Court's 1998 holding that the export portion of the HMT is
unconstitutional,^"^ Customs discovered significant errors and
inconsistencies in the payment database.^"' While resort to paper
records could correct some of these errors, such records were not
available for payments prior to July 1, 1990.^°® Customs then
established diiferent regulations for pre-1990 claims requiring
additional supporting documentation to be submitted.^"^
Ford's claims included both pre- and post-1990 payments and,
therefore, were controlled by two diiferent evidentiary regimes.^'" In
support of its pre-1990 claim Ford submitted a 1998 Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) Report from Customs listing each quarterly
HMT payment made between 1987 and 1992, along with an affidavit
that it was claiming only export shipment-related refunds and two
199. /d. at 1043-44.
200. 676 F.3d 1054 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
201. 26 U.S.C. § 4461 (imposing a tax on any port use), declared unconstitutional by
United States v. U.S. Shoe Corp., 523 U.S. 360 (1998).
202. Fora, 676 F.3d at 1055.
203. Pub. L. No. 99-662, § 501, 100 Stat. 4082, 4133-37 (codified as amended at 33
U.S.C. § 2201 (2006) and in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C).
204. Ford, 676 F.3d at 1056.
205. Id.
206. U.S. Shoe Corp., 523 U.S. at 363.
207. See Ford, 676 F.3d at 1056-57 (detailing issues of mismanagement and poor
administration).
208. Id.
209. Id. at 1057; iee also 19 C.F.R. § 24.24(e) (4) (iv) (C) (2012).
210. 19 C.F.R. § 24.24(e)(4)(iv)(C) requires supporting documentation for pre1990 refunds only, with the exception that post-1990 claims only require supporting
documents where the claimant seeks to prove corrections of payments listed in the
Report/Certification.
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employee declarations attesting to the accuracy of Ford's HMT
payment records.^'' The CIT found this insufficient.^'^ In upholding
the CIT's decision, the Federal Circuit majority pointed out that the
FOIA Report was based exclusively on the ACS database—the very
same unreliable source that gave rise to the bifurcated refund
process—and that those database errors are known to have arisen
from bank employee errors as well as exporter error.^'^ Ford's
employee declarations were insufficient to eliminate the full
spectrum of possible database errors and were, thus, unable to
demonstrate refund entitlement.^''*
Ford's post-1990 claims failed for similar reasons. Customs, having
retained all paper records from the post-1990 era, had no record of
the twenty Export Vessel Movement Summary Sheets (EVMSSs) Ford
produced from its files.^'^ Even taking the most liberal interpretation
of the regulations allowing mere submission to suffice, rather than
requiring Customs' actual acceptance, the panel was not able to hold
in Ford's favor because it produced no further evidence that the
EVMSSs had ever actually been submitted to Customs.^'^
Because the evidence that Ford presented did not raise a genuine
issue of material fact in either the pre- or post-1990 claim, the
majority affirmed CIT's holding in Customs' favor on summary
judgment.^'^ Judge O'Malley, however, dissented from the majority
on the basis that the government failed to carry its burden of
demonstrating absence of any genuine material fact^'^ and that the
majority erred in weighing the evidence, rather than merely
determining whether there was anything to weigh at all.^'^

211. Forrf, 676 F.3d at 1057.
212. M a t 1058.
213. M at 1059.
214. Id. at 1059-60.
215. /d. at 1060.
216. See id. at 1060-61 (offering rather generously that even a declaration averring
that the EVMSSs were indeed submitted would have tipped the scales in Ford's favor).
217. M a t 1060-61.
218. Id. at 1061 (O'Malley, J., dissenting) (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress &: Co., 398
U.S. 144, 157 (1970)) (noting the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine
issue of material fact is on the party defending a favorable summary judgment).
219. Id. at 1063 (holding "all that is required is that sufficient evidence supporting
the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties^
differing versions of the truth at trial" (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242,249(1986))).
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D. Shell Oil Co. v. United States
In another HMT-related claim, the panel in Shell Oil Co. v. United
States^^" dealt with HMT^^' and Environmental Tax^^^ duty drawback^^s
claims for imported petroleum products.^^"* Section 1313(a) of 19
U.S.C.^^^ provides for a ninety-nine percent refund of import duties
paid for goods that are later exported or destroyed before being
used.^^^ The statute further provides that merchandise that
incorporates goods (imported or domestic) of the same kind and
quality as imported duty-paid goods within a three-year window is
eligible for a drawback as substitute merchandise in the same amount
as would have been possible for the imported merchandise itself.^^'
Eligible drawbacks left unclaimed after three years are deemed
forfeited.^^* In clarifying the scope of the drawback eligibility.
Congress in 1999 created a special limited six-month exception
window for the clearing of otherwise expired claims.^^^ The scope
was again revised in 2004 to overturn the Federal Circuit's decision in
Texport Oil Co. v. United States,^^" applying to claims filed on or after

the date of enactment, as well as to any prior-filed drawback claim for
which liquidation was still not final.^*^
Between 1995 and 1996, Shell filed duty drawback claims for
petroleum derivatives for petroleum imports entered between 1993
and 1994 under the substitute good provisions.^^^ Customs refunded
220. 688 F.3d 1376 (2012).
221. See supra note 201 and accompanying text (explaining the Harbor
Maintenance Tax).
222. 26 U.S.C. § 4611 (a) (2006). The Environmental Tax is imposed on crude oil
and petroleum products entered into the United States for consumption, use,
processing, or warehousing. Id.
223. See 19 C.F.R. § 191.2 (i) (2012) (defining a drawback as the refund of all or
part of a customs duty, fee, or internal revenue levied tax imposed under federal law
on an import by virtue of its imported status).
224. SÄeHOa, 688 F.3d at 1378.
225. 19 U.S.C. § 1313(a) (2006).
226. Id.
227. Id. § 1313(b). For example, if a firm pays a $100 import duty on a ton of steel
and two years later the same importing firm seeks to export three tons of newly
manufactured steel gears made entirely of domestically sourced steel, that firm is still
eligible to receive a $99 drawback for the gears as substitute merchandise for the
prior steel import.
228. See id. § 1313(r)(l) (explaining that extensions will only be granted where it
can be established that Customs was responsible for the delay).
229. Miscellaneous Trade and Technical Corrections Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 10636, § 2420(e), 113 Stat. 127, 179. The three-year statutory deadhne was suspended
for claims filed during that time window from June 25, 1999 to December 25, 1999.
230. 185 F.3d 1291, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (interpreting the drawback statute to
preclude drawback for duties unless exclusively linked to imports).
231. Miscellaneous Trade and Technical Corrections Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108429, § 1557(b), 118 Stat. 2434, 2579.
232. Shell Oil Co. v. United States, 688 F.3d 1376,1378,1380-81 (2012).
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ninety-nine percent of the import duties, but Shell failed to include
HMT or Environmental Tax in an express request for refund or add
the amounts paid in its net claim figure and was therefore not
refunded these taxes.^^^ Shell's 1997 protest failed at Customs on
Texport grounds, leading to Shell filing a complaint at the CIT in
1998.^^ The CIT held for Customs on cross-motions for summary
judgment in 2011, finding that neither the 1999 nor 2004
amendments to the drawback statute excused the lateness of Shell's
claim. ^^^
In upholding Customs' decision as the CIT had done,^^^ the
Federal Circuit held that the burden of establishing eligibility for
duty drawback lies with the claimant—a burden Shell failed to
carry.^^' The panel pointed out that Shell failed to file a claim within
the 1999 window for clearing stale claims, in spite of the statute's
explicit creation of an opening and closing date for the six-month
window.^^^ In response to Shell's claims that the pre-1998 regulations
applicable to the claims in question did not require a correct
accounting of the total refund requested for a complete claim, the
panel noted that Shell's drawback requests were filed under special
regulations providing for accelerated payment—regulations that
require the claimant to provide a full and complete accounting of the
expected refund.^^^ In effect, the responsibility for computing the
maximum total refund lay with the importer, not Customs.^^ The
panel disposed of Shell's argument to preserve its claims under the
2004 amendment's effective date provision because the already
liquidated entries did not include a protective claim for HMT and
Environment Tax

233. /d. at 1380-81.
234. /d. at 1381.
235. Id.
236. /(¿at 1381-82.
237. Id, at 1382-83 {citing Aectra Refining &: Mktg., Inc. v. United States, 565 F.3d
1364, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2009)) (noting that placing the burden on Customs of
establishing the maximum possible refund amount for a given drawback claim would
create an untenable administrative burden).
238. 5ei Shell Oil Co. v. United States, 781 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1331 (Ct. Int'l Trade
2011) (requiring that "a drawback claim [be] filed-wvùiin 6 months afier the date of
the enactment of those amendments" (alteration in original) (internal quotation
marks omitted)), affd, 688 F.3d 1376.
239. Shell Oil, 6 ^ F.3d at 1384; see also 19 C.F.R. § 191.72(b) (1995) (requiring a
complete drawback request for accelerated payment to include "a computation of
the amount due").
240. Shell Oil, 688 F.3d at 1384.
241. Again referencing the Federal Circuit's decision in Aectra, the panel
explained^ that the 2004 amendments were never meant to completely waive the
normal three-year time limit, but, rather to apply to entries not completely liquidated
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E. Ford Motor Co. v. United States
In Ford Motor Co. v. United States,^*^ Ford was challenging Customs'

handling of nine reconciliation entries filed to correct an over-deposit
of dudes on Jaguar vehicles imported by Ford in 2005-2006.^*^
Customs had waited long past the applicable deadline without acting
on these entries and then—after Ford commenced a court appeal
seeking a declaratory judgment that duty refunds were owed—had
abrupdy liquidated most of the disputed entries.^*^
The CIT accepted the U.S. government's argument that
liquidadon of the entries, while belated, had eliminated the subject
matter jurisdicdon needed for a court to address Ford's complaint
which invoked the CIT's residual 19 U.S.C. § 1581 (i)^*^ authority.^*«
The Federal Circuit reversed and held that subject matter jurisdicdon
did exist.^*' The court invoked basic "hornbook law" to the effect
that subject matter jurisdicdon depends on facts exisdng at the dme a
claim isfiled.^*^The court observed that post-complaint conduct by
the government as defendant ought to affect jurisdicdon only when
Congress has made clear its intent to allow such a result,^'*' and the
court held that liquidadng the disputed entries here at the
(excessive) deposit rate "may have opened up a new avenue for
judicial review under 19 U.S.C. § 1581 (a), but . . . cannot defeat
subject matter jurisdicdon under § 1581 (i)."^^"
The Federal Circuit also revived certain claims that had been
dismissed on "case or controversy" grounds after the CIT concluded
(wrongly, in the Federal Circuit's view) that Ford had abandoned
them.^^^ Finally, as part of the remand order, the Federal Circuit
vacated the CIT's discredonary dismissal of claims over which it had
acknowledged having subject matter jurisdicdon so that the CIT

that already included in their original claim a request for taxes and fees that may
have been otherwise denied on Texport grounds. See id. at 1385.
242. 688 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
243. 7d. at 1321.
244. M at 1322.
245. 19 U.S.C. § 1581 (i) (2006).
246. Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 716 F. Supp. 2d. 1302, 1310-11 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 2010), rev'd in part and vacated in part, 688 F.3d 1319.
247. ibrd, 688 F.3d^at 1321.
248. M at 1324.
249. Id. at 1326.
250. Id. at 1327. The panel found unpersuasive the government's argument that
ascribing significance to Customs' post-complaint actions here wouW not defeat
jurisdiction, but simply modify its basis from 28 U.S.C. § 1581 (i) to § 1581 (a). Id.
at 1324-25.
251. M at 1329-30.
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might revisit those as well, if it so chooses, in light of the corrected
jurisdictional analysis.^^^
F. Norman G.Jensen, Inc. v. United States
The appeal in Norman G. Jensen, Inc. v. United StateP^ was begun by a

customs broker seeking mandamus to extract an overdue ruling from
Customs on a large batch of protests (308 protests involving 1529
separate entries of Canadian lumber) .^^'* Jensen invoked the CIT's
residual jurisdiction under 19 U.S.C. § 1581 (i), but the CIT dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that a remedy was available
under the enumerated grants ofjurisdiction in § 1581(a)-(h), making
resort to § 1581 (i) inappropriate.^^^
The Federal Circuit agreed with the CIT that, in order to avoid
swallowing the specific grants ofjurisdiction provided in § 1581(a)-(h),
usage of the "catch all" jurisdiction in § 1581 (i) had to be tightly
circumscribed and would not be appropriate in this case.^^^ In
addressing certain specific arguments advanced by Jensen as to why
an action based on § 1581 (i) should be allowed to continue, the
Federal Circuit revisited (and declined to distinguish) its 2011
decision in Hitachi Home Electronics (America), Inc. v. United
CONCLUSION

The Federal Circuit's 2012 term was rich in international trade
issues. Though not very numerous, the cases presented gave the
court the opportunity to see nearly the full spectrum of subject
matter and procedural possibilities of its international trade
jurisdiction—including seeing one of its decisions prompdy
overturned by Congress.

252. /d. at 1330.
253. 687 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
254. Siei(latl326.
255. See id. 2iX. 1329-30 (noting that Jensen could have pursued an accelerated protest
under § 1581 (b) and then challenged any denial of the protest under § 1581 (a)).
256. Id.
257. 661 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert, denied, 133 S. Ct. 757 (2012).
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